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KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Professor Hungdah Chiu,
Taiwan, and Cross-Strait Relations
DR. SU CHI†

It is my great pleasure and honor to be here at this symposium
honoring Professor Hungdah Chiu. Yesterday, I learned a great deal
from Professor Cohen‘s insightful remarks and the two panels this
morning were also highly educational. I feel my trip to this
conference is definitely worth it.
Indeed, Professor Hungdah Chiu was our teacher, our good
friend and mentor; he was also a good husband and a good father. But
from where I came from, many think he was not only all of the above,
but a phenomenon unto himself. He exerted enormous influence on
the course of Taiwan‘s development, including cross-strait relations
and its relationship to U.S. policy. For centuries, knowledge has been
speaking to power in this and other countries. Many people have
done that and many more will continue to do so. The reason why
Professor Chiu stood out so prominently was because his ideas
appeared at the right time and right place.
His influence began in Taiwan in the 1980s and heightened in
the 1990s, an era of great transformation in Taiwan and in the world.
When the Tiananmen incident occurred in 1989, it changed China
and shook the world. 1 Then the Soviet Union collapsed suddenly,
completely, and peacefully in 1991 and that changed the world, too.
The United States became the only superpower and the global
strategic picture was altered. During the 80s and 90s, Taiwan matured
enough economically and socially to democratize.2 People the world
†

Ph.D., Columbia University. The author is chairman of Taipei Forum and professor at the
Graduate Institute of China Studies, Tamkang University. The following is an edited version of
the author‘s remarks delivered as part of China, Taiwan, and International Law: A Symposium in
Honor of Professor Hungdah Chiu on October 5, 2011 at the University of Maryland Francis King
Carey School of Law.
1. See SU CHI, TAIWAN‘S RELATIONS WITH MAINLAND CHINA: A TAIL WAGGING TWO
DOGS 26 (2009) (noting ―the isolation of the PRC after the Tiananmen incident‖).
2. Id. at 3.
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over applauded our democratization as a new Third Wave model.3
But the flip side of democratization in Taiwan is it let the genie out of
the bottle. So, Taiwan was no longer an authoritarian regime, but
democratization also entails that many fingers could henceforth pull
the trigger. Being the only place that could drag the United States and
China into war, Taiwan has since become the tail that wagged two
dogs.4
For two decades, Professor Chiu tirelessly preached the value of
democracy and democratization to Taiwan. He was the leading voice
urging the ending of the martial law, constitutional reform, and
flexible diplomacy. He also talked about democracy and human
rights in mainland China. No less important, he was a forceful
advocate of moderation in cross-strait relations. Until the late 1980s,
there was so little relationship between Taiwan and mainland China
that the term ―cross-strait relations‖ did not even exist.5 Thanks in
part to Professor Chiu a new term, in Chinese haixia liangan guanxi,
and its English translation, ―cross-straits relations,‖ were coined.
Let me quickly recount what I thought were Professor Chiu‘s
major contributions to the vital field of cross-strait relations. He put
forward the idea of ―mutual non-denial‖ of the two sides of the Strait
as a ―political entity.‖ Until then—in fact, even now—neither the
People‘s Republic of China nor the Republic of China recognized
each other as a ―country.‖ Yet people-to-people exchanges began to
flourish in the late 1980s and there was an increasing need for
government-to-government contacts to resolve problems arising from
those interactions. To legitimize the interaction between them,
Professor Chiu proposed that while neither would recognize each
other as a ―country,‖ both could interact on the basis of not denying
each other as a ―political entity.‖ By now, as some of you may know,
this is a pet theme for President Ma Ying-jeou in Taipei.6 Professor
3. The Third Wave Model refers to the transitions to democracies in the late Twentieth
Century. See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE
LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991).
4. See generally SU CHI, supra note 1.
5. Id. at 1 (noting that November 2, 1987 ―is generally considered as the beginning of the
current cross-strait relations‖ and that ―[f]or 38 years prior to that, Taiwan and mainland China
had experienced only military conflict, diplomatic confrontation, and political struggle‖).
6. ‘Mutual Non-denial’ Remains, Ma says, TAIPEI TIMES, Apr. 6, 2008, http://www.
taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/04/06/2003408525. Additionally, on May 30, 2011,
President Ma in an address to the audience at the Asia-Pacific regional conference of the
International Law Association that, unlike ―mutual recognition‖ of East/West Germany and
North/South Korea, the case of Mainland China and Taiwan is best characterized as ―mutual nonrecognition.‖ Ma Ying-jeou, President of the Republic of China, Opening Address at the 2011

SU CHI FINAL PROOF

38

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

5/22/2012 10:11 AM

[VOL. 27:36

Chiu also argued for ―ending of the hostilities‖ and this term was
officially incorporated into President Jiang Zemin‘s ―Eight Points‖
statement in January 1995 in Beijing7 and President Lee Teng-hui‘s
―Six Points‖ statement in April 1995. 8 Professor Chiu also helped
President Lee Teng-hui draft the National Unification Guidelines in
the early 1990s.9 As the Cold War ended and democratization swept
much of the Third World, Taiwan‘s smooth democratization and
moderate China policy at the time were well received worldwide and
particularly welcomed by the United States. This is why we are
extremely grateful to Professor Chiu, who exemplified the best
qualities of Confucian tradition and Western education.
Speaking of the United States, please allow me to mention the
Twin Oaks issue. Some of you may be familiar, and Professor Cohen
may be more familiar than I am, with this episode. Before the
normalization of the U.S.-China relationship in January 1979, the
Twin Oaks had been the official residence of nine ambassadors of the
Republic of China government.10 In the talks leading to normalization,
Beijing demanded ownership of Twin Oaks and Taiwan resisted.11
Professor Chiu dug out a number of important legal cases to support
Taiwan‘s claim.12 Eventually he helped Taiwan and the United States
out of this dilemma by working to add an amendment into the Taiwan

International Law Association Asia-Pacific Regional Conference (May 30, 2011), available at
http://www.cils.nccu.edu.tw/Opening%20Address%20of%20President%20Ma%20Ying-jeou.pdf.
He also mentioned that the idea of ―mutual non-recognition‖ was incorporated into a 2001
international law case book. Id. (citing LORI F. DAROSEH, LOUIS HENKIN, SEAN D. MURPHY &
HANS SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 343 (5th ed. 2008)).
7. Jiang Zemin's Eight-point Proposal, BRIDGING THE STRAITS (Jan. 11, 2011, 5:26 PM),
http://english.cri.cn/4426/2007/01/11/167@184028.htm.
8. See JEAN MARIE HENCKAERTS, THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF TAIWAN IN THE NEW
WORLD ORDER: LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 227–28 (1996) (summarizing the six
points).
9. SU CHI, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that the National Unification Guidelines (NUG) were
passed on February 23, 1991 and were the guiding principle for the ―Lee administration‘s
mainland policy‖). As its title suggests, the NUG set up a framework of a three-phase plan of
eventual unification between China and Taiwan. See id.
10. The Republic of China’s (Taiwan) Twin Oaks Estate, OVERSEAS OFFICE REPUBLIC OF
CHINA (TAIWAN) (Feb. 23, 2008), http://www.taiwanembassy.org/us/content.asp?CuItem=11441.
11. Id.
12. Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), Yongyuan de Qiu Laoshi (永遠的丘老師) [My Mentor Forever,
Prof. Chiu], in GUOJIFA LUNJI (國際法論集) [INTERNATIONAL ARTICLES IN COLLECTION IN
HONOR OF THE SIXTY-FIFTH BIRTHDAY OF PROFESSOR HUNGDAH CHIU] 21, 21–23 (2001)
(describing three incidents used by Professor Chiu: 1) a U.K. case, Civil Air Transport Inc. v.
Central Air Transport Corp. (Hong Kong), [1952] UKPC 25; 2) another case describing how
Canada terminated its relationship with Taiwan; and 3) Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304
U.S. 126 (1938)).
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Relations Act, 13 with the kind assistance of some senators,
specifically Bob Dole and Orrin Hatch, passed in April 1979 by the
U.S. Congress.14 This act allowed Taiwan to retain Twin Oaks to this
day.15 We in Taiwan are eternally grateful for his pivotal role in this
important episode.
Returning to cross-strait relations: after democratization, Taiwan
began to play a role entirely out of proportion to its power. As of
2010, Taiwan‘s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is 1% of the world‘s
GDP, the United States is about 20%; China‘s is about 14%; Japan‘s
another 6%.16 So Taiwan is probably the only country in the world,
other than South Korea, that is dealing with 40% of the world power
with only 1% of its GDP. Because Taiwan is situated in the middle of
the three great powers, whatever Taiwan does and says is always
being watched jealously by all sides. Thus, the management of our
relations with Japan, China, and the United States has always been
very difficult.
For the same reason, its key strategic location transformed
Taiwan from an ―underdog‖ of the previous four decades into ―a tail
wagging two dogs‖ in the 1990s and 2000s. By ―a tail wagging two
dogs‖ I mean, for good or bad, Taiwan drove the policy agenda of the
United States and China for most of the last two decades.17
These two decades can be divided into four periods. Lee Tenghui was our president between 1988 and 2000. 18 But his mainland
policy was so different during his time that it had to be divided into
two periods: the early Lee Teng-hui (1988–1995) and later Lee Tenghui (1995–2000).19 The third period belongs to President Chen Shuibian (2000–2008),20 and the fourth to President Ma Ying-jeou (2008

13. Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §
3301–16 (2006)).
14. Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), supra note 12, at 22.
15. Id. See also 22 U.S.C. § 3303(b) (preventing the invalidation of the Twin Oaks transfer by
declaring that recognition, or non-recognition, of Taiwan did not affect property interests
―heretofore or hereafter acquired by or with respect to Taiwan‖).
16. For a listing of country-specific GDPs, see Country Economic Reports & GDP Data,
GLOBAL FIN. MAGAZINE, http://www.gfmag.com/gdp-data-country-reports.html#axzz1rHvcMN
HJ (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).
17. See generally SU CHI, supra note 1.
18. Id. at xi, xvi.
19. Id. at 2.
20. Profile: Chen Shui-bian, BBC NEWS (June 11, 2012, 7:25 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/2172980.stm.
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to present).21 Generally speaking, Taiwan drove the agenda in all of
the four periods. In these four periods, cross-strait relations have five
dimensions measured from ―hard to soft‖: military, international,
political, economic, and cultural. 22 Generally, the military and
international dimensions are ―hard‖ and the economic and cultural
dimensions are ―soft.‖23 The political dimension could tilt either way.
In the first period, all five dimensions of the relations ―were
clearly at a level of ease.‖24 This was the golden years of Taiwan‘s
existence in the last six decades. 25 During this period, Taiwan
initiated almost everything and China almost always played along.
For example, Taiwan held then, as now, that the two sides should be
equal in status, even though China was much bigger.26 When it came
to signing the four agreements concluded in Singapore in 1993,
Taiwan insisted on equality in the seating arrangement and
everything else. 27 As you know, in Chinese tradition the person
sitting on the right side of the table is considered the more honorable
than the one on the left.28 To show equality, Taiwan side proposed
that the two venerable gentlemen who would sign the documents
switch seats half of the time. 29 But the Chinese and Taiwanese
delegations standing behind the gentlemen were so large that they
had to remain in the same place.30 So, voilà, a funny picture—a very
strange one that I would say is the climax of the Singapore meeting.31
In half of the pictures taken, Mr. Koo Chen-fu of Taiwan and Mr.
Wang Daohan of the mainland were seen sitting or standing in front
of the other gentleman‘s wife and delegation.32 This is totally against
common practice in the diplomatic world.33 And yet Taiwan insisted
on playing this game and China agreed to play along. That was just a
small sign of how Taiwan drove the agenda.

21.
A14.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Andrew Higgins, Taiwan's Pro-China Chief Reelected, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2012, at
SU CHI, supra note 1, at 278.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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During the second period, the relationship went sour after Lee
Teng-hui‘s visit to his alma mater, Cornell University in 1995, 34
which angered Beijing so much that it fired several missiles toward
the island‘s surrounding waters. 35 Taiwan continued to drive the
agenda to a lesser extent, but we still managed to draw attention. For
example, when I was the ministerial chairman of the Mainland
Affairs Council in 1999, I was not aware when President Lee Tenghui made the surprise announcement of the so-called ―special stateto-state relationship‖ between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.36
That announcement shocked the world and brought Chinese jet
fighters across the center line of the Taiwan Strait.37
The third period was even worse. President Chen Shui-bian
governed for eight years and cross-strait relations entered an
unprecedented phase. While military confrontation and diplomatic
competition went harder, the cultural and economic exchanges
became ever more intimate.38 Bilateral trade tripled and the number
of visits doubled in eight years. 39 Against Washington‘s advice,
President Chen pushed for writing a new constitution for Taiwan,
changing the name of the country, and holding a plebiscite to
legitimize the moves.40 He even laid out a timetable for Taiwan‘s de
jure independence. 41 And all these initiatives naturally drove the
United States crazy and made China furious.
In the fourth stage, President Ma Ying-jeou assumed the
presidency in 2008.42 Taiwan‘s GDP in proportion to China‘s shrank
from a little more than one-quarter in 2000 to less than one-tenth in
2008. 43 But Taiwan continued to ―wag the dogs,‖ though in an
34. President Lee‘s incendiary remarks regarding Taiwan‘s status made during his trip
dramatically altered the relationship between Taiwan and the mainland and also the relationship
between China and the United States. For a more in depth discussion of the visit‘s significance,
see id. at 30–51.
35. Id. at 34–35.
36. Id. at 52–53.
37. Id. at 70.
38. Id. at 140.
39. See id. at 172–75.
40. Id. at 214–16.
41. See id. at 217, 226.
42. Id. at 293.
43. China‘s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was $1.198 trillion in 2000 and $4.519 trillion in
2008. By contrast, Taiwan‘s GDP in 2000 was merely $326 billion in 2000 and a little more than
$400 billion in 2008. World Economic Outlook Database, INT‘L MONETARY FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata/index.aspx (follow ―By Countries
(country-level data)‖ hyperlink; then complete query by selecting China and Taiwan Province,
selecting GDP measured in U.S. Dollars, and selecting the appropriate range of years).
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entirely different direction. For instance, Taiwan said its fundamental
policy is ―no unification, no independence, and no use of force.‖44
China never protested. When Taiwan proposed that the two sides
should resume negotiations on the basis of the term ―92 consensus,‖45
China said yes.46 When Taiwan said both should talk on the principle
of ―seeking commonalities and shelving differences,‖ China said yes
again. 47 When Taiwan said ―let‘s start with economic issues first,
political issues later,‖ China said yes. 48 After Taiwan proposed a
―diplomatic truce,‖ the two sides have in deeds, though not in words,
refrained from ―stealing each other‘s diplomatic allies.‖ 49 Taiwan
initiated all these new policies, China agreed to every one of them,
and the United States applauded all along with great relief.
The relationship has gone so much better now that the seating
arrangement is no longer an item for haggling. From 2008 on, during
any and all ceremonies, the guest gets the more honorable right side
and the host sits or stands on the left. The two sides also stopped
arguing over the terminologies in the signed documents. In the 1990s,
for the sake of equality, Taiwan and the mainland would avoid the
use of either side‘s terminologies and strained to find a non-legal
term instead.50 During 2008–2010 a new practice emerged. Each side
would use its own preferred terminologies in its version (in
traditional or simplified characters) of the 15 signed agreements. A
parenthesis would immediately follow to indicate the other side‘s
preferred usage.
In signing the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
(ECFA) in 2010, a new problem arose.51 In Taiwan ―framework‖ is
44. SU CHI, supra note 1, at 295.
45. In 1992, Taiwan and Mainland China reached a rare compromise on the most difficult
issue of sovereignty whereby both agreed to express the concept of ―one-China‖ verbally, but
differed on its definition. In 2000 this compromise was renamed by the author as ―‘92 consensus.‖
And since 2008 the new term has served as the basis for cross-strait dialogue. See generally,
―YIGE ZHONGGUO, GEZI BIAOSHU‖ GONGSHI DE SHISHI (―一個中國，各自表述‖共識的史實)
[―ONE CHINA, WITH RESPECTIVE INTERPRETATIONS‖—A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE
CONSENSUS OF 1992] (SU CHI (蘇起) & CHENG AN-KUO (郑安国), eds., 2002) [hereinafter
CONSENSUS OF 1992].
46. SU CHI, supra note 1, at 295.
47. Id. at 15.
48. See Su Chi: Taiwan Makes a Play, China Takes a Hit, TAIWAN NEWS, Feb. 10, 2012,
http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=1837674.
49. Kwei-Bo Huang, In Pursuit of Gradual Stabilization and Peace Dividends: Cross-Taiwan
Strait Relations and Their Influence on the Asia Pacific, MD. SERIES CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD., no.
3, 2011, at 1, 4.
50. See CONSENSUS OF 1992, supra note 45, at v.
51. Kwei-Bo Huang, supra note 49, at 9.
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―jia-gou,‖ but for China ―framework‖ is ―kuang-jia.‖ If a parenthesis
were added to the title of the agreement, that would not look too
good. Finally it was agreed that a sentence be added to the very end
of the ECFA: ―The different wording of the corresponding text of this
Agreement shall carry the same meaning . . . .‖ 52 Hence, even
linguistically things have improved.
Also, you may be interested to know that one of the fifteen
agreements signed was about judicial mutual assistance. 53 So our
prosecutors, police, and coast guards could now talk to their
counterparts on the phone and visit each other.54 As far as I know,
few people complained; even the opposition party did not complain
about this agreement, because it was generally seen as serving the
best interest of the people.
As shown above, Taiwan basically drove the agenda over the last
twenty years. But I would hasten to note the differences between the
first soft period in the ‗90s, when Professor Chiu made the greatest
contribution, and the current soft period with President Ma in power.
There are, however, five major differences between that first soft
period and today. The first difference is the worsening power balance
for Taiwan, as mentioned earlier. In the early ‗90s, the power ratio
measured in GDP was 1:2. 55 Now three provinces (Guandong,
Shandong, and Jiangsu) surpass Taiwan.56 Second, as a corollary, the
PRC‘s role in the region and the world is much larger than before.
Third, there are closer economic and cultural links between the two
sides. 57 Fourth, and most unfortunately, there is deeper division
inside Taiwan as compared with the ‗90s.58 I would venture to say
that Taiwan‘s internal strife is much worse than what is going on in

52. Haixia Liangan Jingji Hezuo Jiagou Xieyi ( 海 峽 兩 岸 經 濟 合 作 架 構 協 議 /
海 峡 两 岸 经 济 合 作 框 架 协 议 ) [Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement], art. 16(2),
available at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2010-06/29/content_1640769.htm [hereinafter ECFA].
53. Kwei-Bo Huang, supra note 49, at 8.
54. Jerome A. Cohen & Yu-Jie Chen, Partners on Crime, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 6,
2011, at A13, available at http://www.usasialaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/20110706NEWS_INSIGHT.pdf.
55. China‘s 1992 GDP was $488 billion compared to Taiwan‘s 1992 GDP of $220 billion.
World Economic Outlook Database, supra note 43.
56. The GDP‘s of the provinces are $665 billion, $574 billion, and $596 billion, respectively.
Comparing Chinese Provinces with Countries: All the Parities in China, ECONOMIST,
http://www.economist.com/content/all_parities_china (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
57. E.g., ECFA, supra note 52.
58. SU CHI, supra note 1, 278–79 (describing the current ―polarization of public opinion in
Taiwan‖ regarding China).
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the States. And fifth, there is greater difficulty in managing the hard
and soft dimensions simultaneously.
What about the future prospect of the cross-strait relations? The
era of ―a tail wagging two dogs‖ is probably gone forever. I think
Taiwan‘s power to wag the dogs is diminishing, because both the dog
and the tail are changing. How is the dog, the PRC, changing beyond
2012? Let me just put forward this thesis: I think inside China three
processes are occurring at this moment, even though they are still at
the stage of quantitative change, not yet qualitative change.
The first process is power transition and dispersion inside China.
We all know that this year we are going to have an election in Taiwan
and an election in the United States. This year in China there is also
power transition, from Mr. Hu Jintao to Mr. Xi Jinping.59 Previous
Chinese leaders such as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were both
selected, but Xi Jinping was not selected; he was elected. He was
elected not by the people for sure, and not by the small circle of nine
standing members of the Politburo, but by what I call the equivalent
of the Roman Senate. More than four hundred people, mostly the
Central Committee members and alternate members elected Mr. Xi
Jinping and other new leaders into the top positions. This means his
power base is different. In the future, Mr. Xi Jinping and his
colleagues will have to constantly look at these four hundred people,
not at the guy at the top or behind. That is qualitative change, and that
is occurring. It is not democracy yet, but it is different than before.
Second, economically, as evidenced by the Twelfth Five-year
Plan, Chinese leadership is trying to transform the economy from
export-based to consumption based.60 This is a big challenge and they
have never done this before. While this must be terrifying the
Chinese leadership, they have to do it because the export market
outside China is shrinking. 61 In the process of this transformation,
China will appear increasingly not only as a world factory, which
China has been so far, but China will appear increasingly as a market
while still a factory. China‘s future influence will be derived from
this new role—as a market. China is now just about the largest
59. Kwei-Bo Huang, supra note 49, at 24.
60. Key Targets of China’s 12th Five Year Plan, XINHUA GEN. NEWS SERV., Mar. 5, 2011,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/05/c_13762230.htm.
61. See, e.g., China Manufacturing Data Show Risk of Deeper Slowdown on Exports:
Economy, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 12, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-22/china-pmimay-shrink-for-4th-month-survey.html (reporting that a ―measure of export orders fell to an eightmonth low‖).
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trading partner to everybody surrounding it—from Korea, Japan,
Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, and other Southeast Asian
countries. 62 This role is going to be greater in the future. This sea
change for China is very hard to do but the process is beginning.
The third internal process of change is greater popular demand
for participation. I agreed with Professor Cohen and Professor Sun
this morning when you mentioned entrepreneurship and
individualistic tendencies. Deep down the Chinese are very
individualistic. So-called collectivism exists only on the surface. I
used to study the Soviet Union in graduate schools in the United
States, and by comparison, Russia and the Soviet Union truly
exemplify collectivism. That huge land was ruled from Kiev for two
hundred years, and then for centuries everything flew from
Moscow—including politics, culture, economics, cuisine, etc. But in
China you see different capitals, dialects, songs, and cuisines. 63 In
fact, through the dynasties and until the establishment of the Republic
in 1912, China never had a single currency country-wide.
Also about this new demand for participation, in the future, there
will be a proliferation of new actors. As people-to-people exchanges
intensify, new bureaucracies inside China will leap into the Taiwan
policy-making processes; new corporations and new groups will
strive to make their weight felt. Even some individuals who came out
of nowhere would and could splash onto the overall relationship. For
instance, Mr. Chen Guangbiao is a filthy rich guy and he just loves to
play Santa Claus.64 But unlike other rich people with a big heart who
usually donate money to charity groups, Mr. Chen likes to go out on

62. Background Note: South Korea, U.S. DEP‘T STATE, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/
2800.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2012) (noting that China is South Korea‘s leading trading partner);
Saibal Dasgupta, China Becomes Japan’s Biggest Trading Partner Surpassing US, TIMES OF
INDIA, Aug. 25, 2009, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-08-25/china/28187935_1_
bilateral-trade-total-trade-volume-jetro; Background Note: Taiwan, U.S. DEP‘T STATE,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2012) (noting the same
regarding Taiwan); Xu Lingui, China to Become 2nd Largest Trade Partner of Philippines as
Recovery Takes Hold, XINHUA GEN. NEWS SERV., Dec. 30, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/
english/2009-12/30/content_12728233.htm (noting that China is about to become the Philippines
second largest partner.); Dep‘t of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia's Top 10 Two-way Trading
Partners and Australia’s Top 10 Exports, Goods & Services, AUSTL. GOV‘T, http://www.dfat.gov.
au/trade/focus/081201_top10_twoway_exports.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
63. See TONY SAICH, GOVERNANCE AND POLITICS OF CHINA 2–12 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing
the differences in language, ethnicity, and climate throughout China).
64. See Paul White, China Diary, MORNING STAR (U.K.), Feb. 20, 2011, http://
morningstaronline.co.uk/index.php/news/content/view/full/101317 (reporting on Mr. Guangbiao‘s
trip to Taiwan to hand out red envelopes containing $17.2 million in cash donations to the needy).
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the streets and dole out cash directly to the people. 65 During the
Chinese New Year in February 2011 he decided to do it in Taiwan.66
That infuriated a lot of people there. This kind of individual behavior,
totally unsanctioned by officials, could disturb cross-strait relations in
the years to come.
These three processes could combine to make China very
different. It is difficult to imagine this new China would allow itself
to be wagged by a much weaker Taiwan.
Taiwan must learn to deal with a multitude of highly diversified
actors with complex or even conflicting agendas. This is a daunting
challenge.
If the dog is changing, so is the tail. Taiwan is changing in
several ways. First of all, China‘s role vis-à-vis Taiwan will loom
larger than before. China will be at once a bigger opportunity and a
bigger threat. That is the reality we have to live with. Second,
unfortunately, the Blue and Green camps inside Taiwan are both
weak and internally divided. 67 Even though I‘m not an expert in
elections, I do not think President Ma, the incumbent, or either of the
two challengers, Dr. Tsai Inwen and Dr. James Soong, could win
with a comfortable margin in the January 2012 election.68 In fact, the
margin would be so small that none would be able to push a program
as strongly as President Ma did over the past three years. In other
words, Taiwan could be a weaker tail in the future.
Thirdly, as cross-strait relations intensify, the Taiwanese people
feel more ambivalent toward China. That is to say, intimate crossstrait economic and cultural integration entails greater benefits, but at
the same time engenders greater wariness inside Taiwan. This has to
do with the human rights problems in China, different ideologies,
different thinking, and different systems of government. Some people
in the West tend to think that Taiwan is now sliding into the orbit of
the PRC. I totally disagree. I think that is a very unfortunate
misreading of the situation. People do not live by bread alone.
On the one hand, we need the bread. We need to do business
together. But at the same time, we are aware of the differences. So,
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. SU CHI, supra note 1, at 279.
68. On January 14, 2012, President Ma was reelected with 51.6% of the vote, Ms. Tsai won
45.6%, and Mr. Soong won 2.8%. Andrew Jacobs, President of Taiwan is Re-elected, a Result
That is Likely to Please China, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2012, at A6.
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we just have to manage the dialectics—the opportunity and threat at
the same time. President Ma‘s strategy, which I also support, is to
maximize the opportunity and minimize the threat. Of course, that is
easier said than done, but somehow we have to try.
From the foregoing analysis, my conclusion is that the era of ―a
tail wagging two dogs‖ is probably over. We are approaching a new
turning point, if not an era. I don‘t know if it will be a new era or not,
but at least a turning point is coming up. Partly it will depend on who
is going to win the next election.
So as you can see, I am very apprehensive about Taiwan being
weakened to the extent that it cannot handle the complexities of
cross-strait relations anymore, particularly in view of its internal
division. This is why after some brainstorming, I have decided to set
up a new think tank in Taiwan. It is a bipartisan think tank, the first
of its kind in Taiwan. It is not financed by the government or a
political party. It‘s called Taipei Forum. 69 And I have convinced
some Democratic Progressive Party members to work together with
me. We hope that we could at least forge some degree of internal
consensus to prepare for the next moves by the ―new dog.‖ And we
are going to launch the think tank sometime after the election.
In the long run though, I like to think (and I hope I am right) that
Taiwan could exert our role as a democracy. As the Chinese people
are individualistic, enterprising, and free-minded, they can accept
democracy as many others have, even though the eventual system of
government may be different from the Western model of liberal
democracy. I think when they have collected enough money in their
pockets, when they have enjoyed inner freedom, they will want to
have a say in decision making to protect their money. They will want
to have the power to express their ideas freely. Warts and all, Taiwan
could be a model. But the pre-condition for Taiwan to play that role
is to not go for de jure independence. If Taiwan were seen as going
toward de jure independence, China‘s eyes would be closed toward
Taiwan‘s democracy. They would only see that as a threat to their
nationalism. Additionally, Taiwan has to govern itself well to make
itself attractive. This is not easy, especially compared to China‘s
economic performance in the last thirty years. But in the long run, I
am hopeful that Taiwan will continue to play a positive role. We may
not wag the dogs, but we will interact with the dogs positively,
including our relations with the United States.
69. See TAIPEI FORUM, http://www.taipeiforum.org.tw (last visited Apr. 12, 2012).

